What is cia covert operations

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Most covert cia operations. Cia covert operations list. Are cia analysts covert.

Dialogues aimed at addressing inter-community conflicts through active communication Washington, DC, 4th March 2019'The secret operations of the Central Intelligence Agency are an element of the vanguard of power in US foreign policy. But the CIA is not a lone ranger shooting saloons on his own. A high-level group within the United States government serves as the high command of the secret war. Today, the National Security Archive publishes a collection of documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and in-depth archivel research that partly illustrates the scope of the group's activities as they evolved during the Cold War. Today's selection is a small fragment of a new compilation, CIA Covert Operations III: From Kennedy to Nixon, 1961-1974, recently published as part of the main libraries. This is the third part of a series of clandestine CIA activities, curated by Pulitzer historian and candidate author John Prados. This edition tells the story of the epic disaster of the Bay of Pigs through a series of secret activities little known or explored, including the Mongoose operation against Cuba, actions in British Guyana, Bolivia Indonesia, Dominican Republic, Irag (Kurds), and more. The set provides an unprecedented and in-depth coverage of the CIA's top command, ranging from the minutes of the "Special Group" approving the covert operations, to the daily meetings of the CIA director John A. McCone. Among other things, today's selection shows: CIA Director Allen W. Dulles made an offer in June 1961 that © This special group had the autonomous capacity to secret operations. Article Article the powers provided for in the Constitution and the concept of appropriately approved Congress to justify secret operations. He warned that no statutes allowed secret operations (document 4). President Kennedy is Robert F. Kennedy's brother, in March 1962 mentioned personal characteristics and known Fidel Castro acquaintances as things that could be exploited in efforts to neutralize the Cuban leader (document 6). The actions of the CIA, their Cuban allies in exile in March 1963 led the High Command to reconsider its alliance with them against Castro (Document 1608). CIA Director John A. McCone, a member of the High Command Group, spent a lot of time pushing an aggressive strategy against Cuba while acknowledging that US efforts were destined for failure (Documents 8, 9, 10). When he took command of the U.S. government after the death of President Kennedy, in his first meeting with senior command in December 19, 1963, President Lyndon Johnson proved cautious, initially not approving further strikes against Cuba (document 12). The CIA supervisors and secret warriors at the level of the White House were the president of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Intelligence (PFIAB). The surveillance mechanism could be distracted by foreign events in the field of intelligence. For example, the PFIAB meeting (August 8-9, 1964) Closer to the Gulf of Tonkin incident (August 8-9, 1964). (document 14). Lyndon Johnson showed his aversion to the political parties of a neighboring American ally in July 1966 when a CIA project in Italy (Document 15). President Richard Nixon the high command in July 1972 approved a \$ 20,000 (\$ 120,000 in 2018 US dollars) $\tilde{A} \notin \hat{A} \hat{A} \hat{A} \hat{A} \hat{A} = 0$ to the dictator of the Central African Republic, Jean - Bedel Bokassa (Document 18). $\tilde{P} = \tilde{A}$, \tilde{A} , $\tilde{P} = 0$ "xâ $\in 0$ "xâ $\in 0$ "xê $\in 0$ operations of the United States this included the application of the technique of "plausible negability. Under this concept operations and activities are carried out so as to keep the CIA or the United States. In recent history, plausible denial has declined somewhat, as American presidents have tried to allocate open monetary appropriations for operations, or, in the war on terrorism, dispensed from â 156; plausible and simply what one might see denied. But during the Cold War it was 226; here the presidents under review are John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon â.plausibile negability was standard procedure. The CIA and other intelligence agencies used plausible negability, in particular, to isolate the presidents from the charges they had in hand, or even approved, secret operations. But maintaining this fiction gave a special award to the approved and management of these activities by government bodies beyond the CIA itself. In the United States this has become a function of the National Security Council (NSC), or more specifically, of a NSC subcommittee. This unit has changed its name over time, but has maintained the same responsibilities - approval, monitoring and revision. Unless a president chooses to participate personally - ——where; the inter agency committee served as supreme authority for the approval and revision of operations. In fact, this NSA unit was the high command under cover in action. President John F. Kennedyinherited an existing apparatus for making secret decisions. Dwight D. D. and Harry S. Truman created it as the same kind of NSC subcommittee. Named after an Eisenhower directive, NSC 5412/2, the unit was known as the 5412 Group or, to be even more vague, the Special Group. Many of his work sessions, during the first Kennedy administration, were conducted during Tuesday lunches. Subsequent sessions have been called if necessary. The unit has essentially set up a committee of deputy secretaries covering covert operations and strategic reconnaissance. The Task Force had the authority to approve, reject and review all covert activities. President Kennedy has also appointed Taylor as chair of the panel (5412). The small collaborators served the various special groups. From 1961 to about 1965 the executive assistant was a detailed CIA agent who worked officially for the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Subsequently, the assistant did an extraordinary job for the NSC staff holding the intelligence portfolio. This person was typically a detailed CIA officer, too, but in this case they were responsible for the national security advisor, not the DCI. For the (enhanced) Special Group, the assistant was an army colonel. For the Task Force (CI) the Personnel Assistant was an army colonel. For the Task Force (CI) the Personnel Assistant was the NSC staff responsible for global security programmes. (1962-1965) this person a, although formerly of the CIA, functioned as a defense intelligence operations, including covert operations. This was the president of the Advisory Committee for Foreign Intelligence operations, including covert operations, including covert operations. CIA provided the Council with periodic updates, and PFIAB could therefore decide to examine the activities from an NSC perspective. According to the State Department representative, Mac Bundy consulted the President at the level he thought desirable, but did not necessarily tell us if he had, or if he had, or if he had, what the President had had had. "The National Security Advisor was a member of the special group, and after Maxwell left in October 1962 (became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs), his president. Security advisors during this period include Bundy (Presidents Kennedy and Johnson,) Walt Rostow (Johnson,) and Henry Kissinger (Nixon.) The proposals for covert operations originated in various ways. What has become the CIA operation at the Bay of Pigs has begun with the President of the United States himself. Ambassadors, headquarters, the DCI, the Deputy Director for Plans (DDP), the divisions of the DDP area, the State or Defence Departments could all suggest secret operations. Proposals from outside the Agency have often emerged initially from the Special Group. The proposals that began within the CIA have undergone a process of internal approval. This usually originated in DDP. When the most specific approval criteria were formulated in the early 1960s, budget proposals below a certain amount of dollars could be approved directly within the agency, while the larger ones went to the interaction group. The DDP presented for and against the Director's office, and the DCI was a member of the Special Group. He or his deputy attended his meetings. In the State Department, many proposals for secret information were flanked by his Information and Research Office (INR.) During this period the director had an element focused on real analysis, plus a politico-military unit under him. The latter unit has prepared INR comments on covert operations These were eventually forwarded to the Secretary of State for review, and then went to the Secretary of State for review, and the Secretary of State for review, and the Secretary of State for review, and the Secretary of State for review for INR, had been the 128;s State representative in the panel. From April 1961, and in the Nixon years, this person was Ulysses Alexis Johnson (referred to below as $\tilde{A} \notin \sim \sim \hat{A} \hat{A}$). Aside from INR advice, Johnson would normally speak with the Assistant Secretary of State responsible for the region where an operation has been proposed. Johnson said he had maintained good relations with many of his counterparts in other agencies, but faced proposals that presented excessive risks, and thus acquired the nickname ŢÖÄ; Dr. No.226; [2] The Deputy Secretary of Defense would be the Pentagon representative of the task force. As in the state, the work of staff associated with covert operations was the responsibility of a different part of the bureaucracy. Until the summer of 1961, this was the Office of Special Activities (SACSA). President Kennedy inherited some ongoing operations that had been approved by the Task Force during Eisenower's time226; 128; These include efforts in the Dominican Republic, Tibet, the Congo and against Castroâ 128; Cuba. The Dominican Republic, Tibet, the Congo and against Castroâ 128; Cuba. The Dominican Republic, Tibet, the Congo and against Castroâ 128; Cuba. The Dominican Republic, Tibet, the Congo and against Castroâ 128; Cuba. The Dominican Republic, Tibet, the Congo and against Castroâ 128; Cuba. The Dominican Republic, Tibet, the Congo and against Castroâ 128; Cuba. The Dominican Republic, Tibet, the Congo and against Castroâ 128; Cuba. The Dominican Republic, Tibet, the Congo and against Castroâ 128; Cuba. 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He met and discussed the proposal with the members of the panel. Thus President Kennedy met with members 5412 on Cuba several times (e.g. Documents 6 and 8), as did President Johnson (Document 12). In early 1962, the president added the Special Task Force (Counterinsurgency) to focus on military and police assistance projects, anti-guerrilla operations and other security programs. It differed from Group 5412 by including officials from the International Development Agency, the United States Information Agency and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. The President considered the Memorandum of Action for National Security that established it. When General Taylor moved to the Chiefs of Staff, several members wanted to transfer the committee to the State Department, but instead remained within the NSC, where Bobby Kennedy wanted to be president. Instead, Alex Johnson succeeded to the presidency and Michael Forrestal followed Max Taylor as the White House representative. Averell Harriman remained influential. A problem with all special groups within their NSC context is what exactly did it mean? Was the Task Force a commanding authority, giving orders that the CIA, the Pentagon, and the State Department were required to execute? Or was it an interdepartmental committee that made recommendations to members of the internal services, coordinating rather than directing? The confusion largely due to the plausible deniability convention. The presidents were unable to clarify the issue because © they should not have been seen meddling in Alex Johnson, the representative of the State Department, while writing only from the Special Group (CI), makes remarks that could apply equally easily to other units: Bobby Kennedy, the Department of Defense and, to some extent, The president never convinced himself that we were coordinating departments instead of running them. I have always felt that our decisions could only make sense to the extent that we implement them through our services, which are the only ones with the authority to allocate funds and people to make them work. I don't think the president always understood that. He usually wanted quick results and was inclined to think that if he put someone in charge of something, that person would be able to give the instructions that the departments would have to follow. John Kennedy's experience in Cuba confirms Alex Johnson's point of view. At the end of the 1961 President Kennedy added a variant committee called the Special Group (Increased), which dealt entirely with operations against Cuba. It seems he considered normal 5412 too cautious or too slow. The thought was that Bobby would keep his balls in the air. The representative of the State Department writes of this effort, 'Recognizing that the internal circumstances in Cuba were not suitable for a rapid reversal, however, the Special Group (Aggregate) should first focus on the acquisition of concrete data on possible objectives, a clear reference to Edward Lansdale's plan "Operation Mongoose" in February 20th 1962 (Document 5). Johnson also reports that the High Command never mentioned murdering Castro. Johnson quotes President Kennedy, already in March 1962, as doubting there would have been a revolt in Cuba. "I have never had moral scruples about Mongoose," says Alex "But I've never thought about it." Bobby Kennedy was outside. Alex Alex He also quotes: â We are in a combat situation [with Castro] and we have complete command. There is no reason for the richest and most powerful nation in the world to do so. President Kennedy encouraged Lansdale but often withdrew when it came to approving specific covertul nation [with Castro] and we have complete command. There is no reason for the richest and most powerful nation in the world to do so. President Kennedy encouraged Lansdale but often withdrew when it came to approving specific covertul nation in the world to do so. operations with high noise levels. Even the high command might be shaky. Later in 1962, JM/WAVE, CIAâÂs Miami Station, came up with the idea of contaminating a shipment of Cuban sugar bound for Eastern Europe. The Mongolian plans had discussed sabotage in the abstract, but the prospect of nauseating innocent consumers, especially in the communist satellite countries, which was also a target of covert operations of influence, was too much. But as Alex Johnson recounts, the ship had sailed when the Special Group (Augmented) had the wind of it. At the end of 1962, the operation ran into the Cuban missile crisis. Then JFK climbed even higher, to its NSC Standing Group. Every time he looked for the high-ranking officer. Alex Johnson closes his point this way: 226;Ô¶ Creating jobs outside the chain of command [and] waiting for them to support Washington on its head ignored the realities of power in the government, and Congress, which holds the services and their secretaries responsible for how funds and staff were allocated. That said, this collection of officials, which included the Director of the CIA and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, could accomplish a lot within their services. The task forces brought together key officials who had formal authority, and the records in this EBB show that they are going in great detail on plans and undercover activities. To the extent that there was a high command of the secret war, that was it. Such agreements remained standard during the period despite repeated changes of names for the special group. President johnson abolished the Special Group (Anti-insurgency), but Committee 303 continued in the first year of the Nixon administration, when its designation changed to Committee 40, once again taken from the number of a memorandum of decision on national security. The work of the special group and the nature of the proposals submitted to it have changed over time. For most of the time covered by this assignment, covert operations were big business. Between January 1961 and the fall of 1962 the Special Group approved secret operations 550. Data provided to congressional investigative committees in the 1975s; 226? Huh? projects from January 1961-November 196663; Huh? These approvals exclude bread and butter as reconnaissance missions. follow-up decisions on existing projects, or proposals below a particular threshold. The activity peaked in the 1964's and remained strong through the Special Group's imprint. In the first five months of the 1964, the Special Group approved 23 of the draft 35. The center of gravity of the secret action has also changed over time. The Kennedy administration focused on Latin America, particularly Cuba. This attention has continued, but the proposals have spread at regional level. From January 1967 and June 1968, the 303 Committee examined projects 23 for Africa, 33 for Latin America, 15 for Europe, 14 for Asia and 2 for the Middle East. The reason for the lack of proposals for the Middle East has been given as a poor operation activity. President Kennedy held at least one meeting In 1961. Apart from a mention from time to time at the special group, there is no indication of subsequent specific revisions. Different consultants or CIA consultants or time at the special group, there is no indication of subsequent specific revisions. Different consultants or CIA consultants or CI under which covert transactions which had not been audited were automatically cancelled. But Kissinger did not meet the interagency body often enough to be practical. Where a special group met weekly, Kissinger's 303 Committee held only 18 meetings in 1969, 19 in 1971. For three years after the 40 Committee did not hold more than one session annually. [10] The standard became project approval over the phone, which made the reviews practically impossible. Treatment of projects of covert operations varied also. For example, the 303, then 40 committees considered and authorized different phases of the project Glomar Explorer and new measures for the secret war in Laos, but the high command would be kept in the dark about â ¬ ÅTrack IIâ of NixonÅ¢ Plan the plan to overthrow Salvador Allende of Chile. Future e-books will address several specific cover operations of this era, further illustrating the breadth and depth of the CIA Set III document collection.

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